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1.0 Introduction 
 
As was outlined in the chapter by Slack and Bird (2018) governments should raise revenue by 
using instruments that minimize distortions and maximize fairness. This is why they say that 
the sensible rule of local finance is to “wherever possible, charge!” (Bird and Slack 2014) That 
is, where possible, the direct users, the beneficiaries, of the good or service should pay the price 
of providing the good or service. By charging users directly, this ensures that the goods or 
services are consumed by those who value them the most and the government obtains direct 
feedback as to whether citizens really desire the provision of the good or service at the cost 
incurred to provide that good or service. 
 
In Canada, there are three main types of legally recognized revenue instruments that are most 
in line with the user charge model: user fees, regulatory charges, and proprietary charges 
(referred to collectively as user levies). User fees are levies that are used to recoup the cost of 
providing a good or service, regulatory charges are levies that are used to recoup the cost of 
granting a right or privilege, and proprietary charges are levies that are used in relation to a 
proprietary interest. These three user levies are available to be used by all levels of government 
in Canada, including municipalities, having been generally devolved by all the provinces. 
While these levies have key differences that are well established by legal tests, they also share 
a lot in common with each other as well as with taxes. As a consequence, user levies have 
faced numerous legal challenges but also a number of negative internal audits demonstrating 
that governments have limited expertise regarding the clear and definitive design and 
implementation of user levies. This challenge weighs heavily on municipalities because they 
have only been devolved the constitution authority for limited revenue powers and if a user 
levy is found not meet the legal limitations set for it, municipalities can find themselves in a 
challenging legal position. The worst case scenario faced by municipalities would be the case 
where they levy is found outside of the jurisdictional sphere of the municipality and the 
revenues associated with the levy need to be repaid. 
 
What are user levies? How do they differ from a tax? When are user levies an appropriate or 
preferred policy instrument? What are the trends in user levies across Canada? What are the 
implications for municipal activities and budgets? How can user levies be used by municipal 
governments in relation to emerging pressures? This chapters will document the increasing 
reliance on user levies by municipal governments in Canada compared to the provincial and 
federal governments and show that this increasing reliance is generally consistent across Canada. 
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It will outline reasons for the increasing reliance. The paper will clarify the legal definitions and 
limitations on user levies in Canada and what this mean for the design and implementation of 
these levies. Finally, the paper will explore both existing and emerging opportunities for the 
employment of user levies using case studies and present areas of potential concern along with 
suggestions for improvement. 
2.0 Trends in User Levies 
If the theory is “whenever possible, charge”, what has been the take up of user levies in Canada? 
While the chapter by Slack and Bird (2018) and Dahlby and McMillan (2018) provide a view of 
the sale of goods and services that is but one category of user levies. The Statistics Canada data 
sources (Financial Management System for the years 1998-2008 and Government Finance 
Statistics for the years 2008-2016) do not delineate well across various types of user levies, often 
including user fees, regulatory charges, and proprietary charges within the same categories. As a 
result, no comparisons can be made regarding specific user levies, but rather user levies in 
general.1 
The data clearly show that, while user levies are revenue tools that are available to all levels of 
government, they are not used to the same degree by all levels of government. Figure 1 presents 
the share of own source (excluding intergovernmental grants) revenues raised by taxes, user 
levies, and other revenue sources by the various levels of government in Canada for the year 
2016. Figure 1 shows that while all three levels of government rely on user levies, municipalities 
rely on them the most. The federal government raises 12.2% of their own source revenues from 
user levies, with the majority (65%) of these user levy revenues coming from social security 
contributions (notably Employment Insurance and Canada Pension Plan Premiums), which are 
forms of regulatory charges. Provincial governments raise 22.5% of their own source revenues 
from user levies, the sources of which vary by province. Resource rich provinces such as 
Newfoundland, Saskatchewan, Alberta, and BC raise much of their user levies from the 
regulation and sale of natural resources, which are forms of proprietary charges. In non-resource 
rich provinces the revenues are from a variety of user levies, including rents from social housing 
(proprietary charges), worker safety and compensation regimes (regulatory charges), the 
proceeds from the sale of liquor (proprietary charges), and various administration of licensing 
(e.g. regulatory charges on drivers). In comparison, municipalities raise more than a third, 
37.1%, of their own source revenues from a number of different types of user levies, including 
revenues from service provision (e.g. user fees on services like public transit). 
 
 
1
 The data related to revenue collected by governments in Canada for 2008-2016 is available through the Statistics 
Canada Canadian Government Finance Statistics (CFGS) database. The data is available in consistent categories for 
the federal government (Table 385-0033), the provincial governments (Table 385-0034), and municipal 
governments (Table 385-0037). However, the classifications of the revenue across the various categories often 
mixes taxes, user levies,charges, and other. As a result, the author took great care to create her own classifications 
based on her knowledge of the legal definitions of the various levies.  
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Comparing the reliance on these various sources over time also presents an informative trend. 
Figure 2 presents the share of own source revenue raised by these three categories of revenue by 
the three levels of government for the year 1998, the earliest the data is available, and 2016, the 
last year currently available. Figure 2 shows that the federal and provincial governments are 
increasingly relying on taxes as a source of revenue whereas user levies are showing a declining 
share of revenues for these governments. This contrasts with the trend shown by municipalities 
which are reducing their reliance on property taxes and increasing their reliance on user levies. In  
particular, as shown in figure 3, while user levies decreased as a share of own source revenues by 
17% for the federal government and 23% for the provincial governments, user levies increased 
as share of own source revenues by nearly 70% for municipal governments, increasing from 
21.9% to 37.1% of revenues. 
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Of course, provinces and municipalities operate within geographic contexts that may result in a 
varying application of user levies across Canada. This context is dictated by various institutional 
aspects, many of which are established by devolution of powers, along with the fact that each 
province has very different economic and geographic characteristics, settlement patterns, 
population density, and public policy priorities, all which may influence their reliance on user 
levies. Figure 4 shows the share of own source revenue raised by the provincial governments for 
the year 2016. The share of user levies raised by the provinces varies from a low of 12% in 
Ontario to a higher of nearly 35% by Alberta. It is interesting to note that the share of own source 
revenues from user levies is the highest in the three most Western provinces of Saskatchewan, 
Alberta, and B.C., along with Newfoundland and Labrador, while the Eastern provinces, 
excluding Newfoundland and Labrador, all show the lowest reliance on user levies.  
 
Figure 5 shows the share of own source revenues raised by taxes, user levies, and other 
revenues raised by the municipalities across the ten provinces for the year 2016. The share of 
own source revenues raised by user levies varies from a low of 26% in Quebec to a high of 
57.8% in Saskatchewan. It is interesting to note that municipalities in the four Western 
provinces all show the highest reliance on user levies, averaging 47.1%, while municipalities 
in the eastern provinces all show a lower reliance on user levies. In fact, there does appear to 
be a high degree of correlation between the reliance on user levies at the provincial level and 
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the municipal level in the provinces. Regardless, the municipalities in all the provinces all 
show a higher reliance on user fees than their provincial and federal counterparts. 
 
 
 
As has been shown above, Canadian municipal governments have, compared to their 
provincial and federal counterparts, increasingly turned to user levies rather than taxes to fund 
their activities. This is likely partially due to a number of interrelated factors. First, Canadian 
municipal governments are constitutionally constrained to limited revenue sources despite 
facing increasing infrastructure pressures, services demands, and expectations from the 
constituents. Second, municipalities are increasingly likely to be involved in the provision of 
goods, services, or rights where the direct beneficiary is well defined, such as public transit 
and community pools, as pointed out by Slack and Bird (2018). Third, financial support to 
municipalities from other levels of government, in the form of grants, has been declining (as 
detailed by Kitchen 2018) at the same time that increases in property taxes to fund municipal 
capital and operational outlays has faced increasing opposition from municipal taxpayers.2 
Fourth, Canadian municipalities are often constrained by having to adhere to borrowing limits 
and by being disallowed from incurring operational deficits, further limiting public finance 
 
2 The chapter by Dahlby and McMillian (2018) show how property taxes as a share of household income have 
flatlined. 
63.8% 59.8%
72.3% 71.0% 72.5%
59.4%
53.2%
38.9%
55.7% 51.0%
35.0% 40.2%
27.3% 28.1% 26.0%
37.7% 44.6%
57.8%
40.8% 45.1%
1.2% 0.0% 0.4% 0.9% 1.5% 2.9% 2.2% 3.4% 3.5% 3.8%
0.0%
10.0%
20.0%
30.0%
40.0%
50.0%
60.0%
70.0%
80.0%
90.0%
100.0%
NL PEI NS NB Que Ont Man Sask Alta BC
Figure 5: Share of Own Source Revenues by Municipal Governments 
by Province, 2016
Taxes User Levies Other Revenues
Source: Statistics Canada Table 385-0037. Classifications of Revenue by Category Done by Author.
7 
 
options to assist in solving public policy problems. Finally, municipalities that are home to 
federal or provincial properties (including universities) face the burden of having to provide 
goods and services for those properties and their associated workers, yet those properties are 
exempt from paying property taxes, though not user levies. While payments-in-lieu (also 
known as grants-in-lieu) payments from these high order levels of government to affected 
municipalities are supposed to compensate municipalities for the forgone property tax 
revenues3, these payments in lieu of taxes have been declining4, eliminated5, or disputed6 in 
recent years. In a way then, municipal government have been compelled towards user levies 
rather than necessarily through a recognition of their efficiency improvements over taxes. 
 
3.0 Defining User Levies 
While there has been an increasing reliance on the user-pay model to fund municipal obligations 
in Canada, the application of the user-pay model is constrained by an important factor. Notably, 
user levies have very specific legal constraints on them that may be at odds with the nature of the 
specific infrastructure for which funds are being sought. As a result, designing and implementing 
these user levies requires expert knowledge because user levies have legal limitations on them as 
revenue tools and the courts have established tests to determine if a levy meets these limitations. 
If a user levy is not carefully crafted to meet these limitations, then the levy may be found to be 
beyond the power of any particular municipality to impose. When these limitations are properly 
adhered to, though, user levies can be an important source of revenue to fund municipal activities 
and address municipal pressures. 
What are the various user levies available to municipalities in Canada? As previously mentioned, 
a user levy generally refers to some form of payment for a resource, infrastructure, good, service, 
or right provided or owned by a government. There are three main types of constitutionally 
recognized user levies in Canada: user fees, regulatory charges, and proprietary charges. What 
are these levies? How are user levies different from taxes? How can these levies be 
differentiated? To what activities do these levies apply? The extensive case law that exists 
related to legal challenges of various levies provides answers to these questions. The limitations 
and tests for user fees and regulatory charges have previously been detailed in Athaus, Tedds, 
and McAvoy (2011), Farish and Tedds (2014), and Alhaus and Tedds (2016), and Tedds (2017), 
whereas proprietary charges have yet to be well detailed in the literature.  
3.1  Taxes 
 
3 The chapter by Kitchen (2018) discusses payments-in-lieu of taxes in more detail. 
4
 For example, in British Columbia, the pool of funds set aside for payments-in-lieu of taxes has not increased since 
its inception. As a result, the payments have not kept pace with inflation, let alone with the expansion of services 
offered. The payments per property have also been reduced because the pool of properties, particularly the number 
of post-secondary institutions, covered by the funds has expanded.  
5
 For example, in the 2017 provincial budget, the Government of Saskatchewan eliminated payments-in-lieu of taxes 
to municipalities for properties owned by SaskPower and SaskEnergy, eliminating $36 million in annual funding to 
municipalities in the province.  
6
 The City of Halifax provides an example of such a dispute. The federal government owns the Halifax Citadel 
National Historic site. In calculating the amount of the payment-in-lieu of taxes, the federal government valued the 
42 acres of land in downtown Halifax at $10, despite a local assessment of the land of $19 million. The nominal 
value set by the federal government reduced the amount of the grant-in-lieu of taxes by millions of dollars. 
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The key distinction between a tax and a user levy is that the former is a payment for the purpose 
of raising revenue not connected to the activity being taxed, whereas the latter is a payment 
connected to the activity being charged. Notably, tax revenues can be used to fund any 
government activity, whereas user levies are constrained in this area. For example, revenue from 
property taxes can be used to fund police services, public walkways, beautification efforts, street 
lights, and so forth. Tax revenues may be earmarked for specific purposes, for example the 
revenues from a local service tax may be earmarked for the purposes of providing municipal 
infrastructure to benefiting properties, but that earmarking is a political choice rather than a legal 
constitutional requirement. 
3.2 User Fees 
A user fee is a charge for a publicly provided good or service, the revenues for which must be 
solely used to fund the provision of that good or service, and the fee charged is dictated by the 
cost of providing the good or service. Further, payment of the fee is a necessary condition for 
consuming the good or service. User fees, therefore, are valuable tools related to offsetting the 
operating costs of municipal services. There are many examples of user fees, particularly at the 
municipal level, including public transit fares, recreation fees, and refuse collection payments. 
These conditions have several implications for the design, implementation, and use of user fees 
in Canada. First, user fees are a cost-recovery revenue tool. This means that the fees must be 
used to recoup actual costs incurred, the revenues from user fees must be solely used to offset the 
costs of providing the good or service, and there must be a tight link between the activity being 
charged and the activities funded by the user fee revenue. That is, there is a need to track the 
money collected along with how the money is spent. Second, the user fee must be designed to 
not intentionally generate a surplus of revenues. Ongoing surpluses are a clear indication that the 
fee charged exceeds the costs incurred, violating the cost-recovery nature of the revenue tool. 
There is, however, no requirement for the revenue from the user fee to fully offset costs, but any 
shortfall in revenues must be made up from revenues from taxes. Third, the fee charged must be 
reasonably connected to the costs incurred by providing the good or service to that user. Notably, 
if the costs of providing the service are fixed, that is it costs the same amount to provide each 
unit or it costs the same amount to provide the service to every user, the fee charged cannot vary 
by unit or user. Unlike taxes, the legal constraints make user fees use as a general revenue tool or 
their use to cross-subsidize various public provided goods and services very problematic and 
doing so would not sustain a court challenge. 
3.3 Regulatory Charges 
While a user fee is a charge related to a publicly provided good or service, a regulatory charge is 
a charge related to a right or privilege granted by a government. Regulatory charges are a broad 
category of charges imposed by governments and include such levies as development charges, 
local improvement charges, removal and dumping charges (e.g. sand, gravel, water, landfill, 
electronics, and beverage containers), fines, inspections, environmental protection, and licenses 
(e.g. liquor, animal, and business). 
There are four key components to a regulatory charge: (1) a specific regulatory purpose: (2) a 
detailed code of regulation; (3) actual costs incurred; and, (4) a relationship between the 
regulation and the person being regulated (Farish and Tedds 2014, p. 658; Althaus and Tedds 
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2016, p.53). Under a regulatory charge, the revenues must be used to recover the costs of the 
regulatory scheme, in whole or in part. That is, much like a user fee, a regulatory charge is a 
cost-recovery tool and the conditions described above that a user fee must meet must also be met 
by a regulatory charge.7 This means that for Canadian municipalities, regulatory charges and 
user fees differ only in purpose. Both are cost-recovery tools: a user fee is a charge for a good or 
service, whereas a regulatory charge is for a right or privilege (e.g. serving liquor, owning a dog 
or cat, and the disposal of specific products).  
3.4 Proprietary Charges 
In addition to user fees and regulatory charges, a government may invoke charges that are the 
“exercise of proprietary rights over its public property.” (Hogg 2014, 31.10) There are two uses 
for proprietary charges: first, selling directly or granting permits, leases, licenses, rents, or 
royalties that permit private firms to extract publicly-owned natural resources8; and second, 
selling goods and services that are supplied by government “in a commercial way.” (Hogg 2014, 
31.10). Clearly, resource royalties and similar regimes fit the definition of a proprietary charge, 
meeting the first use listed above and are very similar to regulatory charges. 
The second use of proprietary charges appears very similar to what user fees are, with the key 
qualifier being how they are supplied, specifically in a commercial way. Notably, that for a 
proprietary charge to apply as opposed to a user fee, the government must be acting like a private 
proprietor. Here, the charge may be determined by market forces and the government is free to 
generate general revenue from the imposition of the charge. That is, unlike user fees and 
regulatory charges, revenues from proprietary charges are not required to be solely used for cost 
recovery.  
Examples of proprietary charges include the mark-up (i.e. profit) applied to alcohol that is owned 
and sold by a government commercial supplies (e.g. the LCBO in Ontario)9, stumpage fees to 
harvest timber from public land, and rental payments made to the government related to the 
rental (e.g. the rental payment applied for publicly provided housing) or leasing of government-
owned land or property (e.g. the lease payment for a daycare to operate out of a school)10. While 
user fees and regulatory charges are required to be administered in a cost-recovery manner, 
proprietary charges are not similarly constrained. Instead, proprietary charges can generate a 
 
7
 There is a second permitted use of a regulatory charge. One where the size of the charge levied on persons is set to 
proscribe, prohibit, or encourage a specific behaviour. If the purpose of the regulatory charge is to change behaviour, 
then a surplus of revenues may be a permitted outcome. However, the presence of a behavioural modification aspect 
has been found by the courts to mean the regulatory charge meets the criteria of an indirect tax. The authority to 
charge indirect taxes, however, is not delegated to the provinces and, therefore, cannot be delegated to 
municipalities. Therefore, a regulatory charge enacted by a municipality must still meet the definition of a direct tax, 
which, according the courts, means that the objective of behavioural modification as a principal objective of a 
regulatory charge is not available to Canadian municipalities, or provinces for that matter. 
8
 In comparison, a levy on the extraction and production of privately-owned resources would be a tax. 
9
 Toronto Distillery Co. v. Ontario (Alcohol and Gaming Commission) 2016 CarswellOnt 19995; 2016 ONCA 960; 
135 O.R. (3d) 637; 274 A.C.W.S. (3d) 138Ontario Court of AppealOntarioDecember 20, 2016 
10
 Québec (Procureur général) v. Algonquin développements Côte Ste-Catherine inc. (Développements Hydroméga 
inc.) 2011 CarswellQue 11739; 2011 QCCA 1942; [2011] R.J.Q. 1967; 211 A.C.W.S. (3d) 461; 343 D.L.R. (4th) 
272; J.E. 2011-1853; EYB 2011-197199Cour d'appel du QuébecQuebecOctober 21, 2011Docket: C.A. Qué. 
Montréal 500-09-019625-094Subject: Constitutional; Natural Resources; Public 
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surplus of revenues over the costs incurred related to the proprietary regime, and those surplus 
revenues can be spent to fund any type of government activity. 
3.5 Considerations 
The legal limitations on these three types of user levies make them imperfect revenue tools to 
fund the Canadian city. With respect to user fees and regulatory charges, public finance theory 
says that government revenues should not be constrained to certain expenditure categories. 
However, this imperfection has to be balanced with the related public finance theory that user 
levies are more efficient than taxes. Proprietary charges are the most aligned with public finance 
theory in that the charge can not only be determined by market forces, rather than solely by 
costs, and the revenues from proprietary charges can generate a surplus of revenues that are 
unconstrained.  
Not only are user levies efficient, user levies can also be more equitable than taxes, depending on 
implementation. User levies satisfy the benefits-received principle of equity, where there is a 
clear link between the good, service, or right being provided and the benefit the consumer 
receives. User levies favour the benefits received principle as it is the main beneficiary that pays. 
User levies, however, are often discounted by opponents as a viable option to raising revenues 
because they are regressive instruments. This means that the levies take up more of the income 
of a lower income payer than a higher income payer. This ignores that fact that whether or not a 
revenue tool is actually regressive depends not on the levy itself but on how the levy is designed 
and implemented. Any regressivity associated with user levies can often be offset by careful 
attention to implementation, including discounts, increased service provision, and cash transfers, 
but doing so requires the municipality to engage in detailed distributional analysis and take a 
broad view of the services that should be equitably available. That said there are areas of 
concern. For example, governments across Canada have committed to employing gender-based 
analysis to policies. Taking a gender lense,it is possible that user levies may fall more heavily on 
women, who tend to have a higher consumption of government services, leading to questions 
about the application of user fees for basic services that affect living standards and economic 
participation, an important distributional impact that has not yet been carefully studied.  
User levies are also more visible and add to accountability. The user knows exactly what they are 
being charged for, how much they are consuming, and can help the user take steps to manage the 
amount charged. This is the concept of tax salience, the concept that people are more likely to 
change their behaviour in response to highly visible and highly salient taxes. User levies, 
therefore, add a layer of accountability between the user and government. That said, payees of 
user levies do not always appreciate this visibility, expressing dissatisfaction with having to pay 
a multitude of fees as opposed to just one property tax bill.  
While aspects of efficiency, equity, and transparency are not mundane issues and need to 
carefully be considered, possibly the most important complexity to tackle is the overlapping 
nature of these user levies. What is a service? What is a right or privilege? What is a commercial 
purpose?  A parking levy, for example, can be all of these things: on street parking can be a 
service, a permit related to parking privileges can be a right, and parking can also be provided on 
a commercial basis. While the lines can be and often are blurred between these three types of 
user levies, the limitations placed on these charges mean that the blurring may simply pose a 
choice burden on a municipality that can be addressed by being clear about the intention of the 
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levy, the objectives of the levy, and the legislative mandate of the body collecting the levy. In 
addition, careful review of the case law related to the levies can help inform design. 
4.0 Opportunities for User Levies 
4.1 Existing Opportunities 
The data presented above shows that there has been an increasing reliance on user levies, but the 
lack of detailed and comparable data does not allow for a clear understanding of how this unfolds 
across each of the three types of user levies described here. However, given the overlapping and 
interchangeable nature of these levies and that different jurisdictions may apply the levies 
differently for the same locally provided good or service, the breakdown may not provide a 
useful comparison. A further complication is in some provinces, like British Columbia, some 
municipal services are actually provided by regional districts and the Regional Districts charge 
the municipalities directly for services. The municipalities then determine how to recoup those 
charges from the constituents. This means that the regional district can charge its municipalities a 
user levy for a service (e.g. sewage services, refuse collection), but the municipality is not 
obligated to pass that charge along to its constituents in the form of a user levy. It could, instead, 
pass the cost along in the form of higher property taxes. So the reliance on user levies by 
governments may not paint an accurate picture of whether users actually pay a user levy in some 
jurisdictions (Tedds 2017).  
While the data on municipal public finance in Canada that was presented in section 2 above is 
informative, it does not allow for a comparison of revenues and expenses matched to a service 
line to get a clearer picture of the deployment of use levies. More disturbing is that few provinces 
provide such data about the financing and spending patterns of their municipalities. Such data is, 
however, available in the province of Alberta (Alberta 2017). The province of Alberta releases 
comprehensive annual statistics on revenue and expenditures by local governments within the 
provinces. This provincially provided data offers much greater information about the source of 
revenues and expenditures than provided by the Statistics Canada data presented above.   
The latest year of data available for Alberta is for 2016. Information is obtained on revenues, 
including the portion raised through user levies, and expenses across four key municipal service 
lines for which user levies can be charged, meeting the criteria outlined in the chapter by Bird 
and Slack in this volume. These four service lines are public transit, water supply and 
distribution, waste water treatment and disposal, and waste management. Figure 6 presents 
information on user levies as a proportion of reported expenses across these four municipal 
service lines for all municipalities in Alberta, as well as broken down across cities as compared 
to all other types of smaller municipalities. Broadly there does appear to be clear evidence that 
municipalities in Alberta do have room to increase their reliance on user levies. Overall, Albertan 
municipalities obtain 75% of their revenues for all of the five service lines from user levies. The 
proportion is higher in cities at 77% compared to 65% in all other types of municipalities.  
The pattern across each of the five service lines shows some interesting variation both within and 
across the service line. The service line with the lowest share of user levies as a proportion of 
expenses is public transit. Across Alberta, user levies only account for 32% of expenditures on 
public transit and most of this is due to cities, in which user levies account for 33% of public 
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transit expenditures, whereas it is only 11% in all other Albertan municipalities. As noted in the 
chapter by Slack and Bird (2018, p.#) in this volume: 
Although it is generally believed that some of the costs of running the transit system 
should be covered by fares and the rest should be subsidized, the optimal amount of 
subsidy is difficult to determine. Part of the problem is that, because roads are not priced 
on a user fee basis (as discussed below), public transit usually needs to be subsidized to 
be competitive with road use (Parry and Small 2009). 
Given that the only toll road in Alberta is related to entry into Banff National Park it is not 
surprising that public transit in Alberta is heavily subsidized. That said, arguments could be 
made that there is room to shift the model, especially considering the degree to which public 
transit in the City of Toronto is reliant on user levies (70-80%) (Slack and Bird 2018, p. #).  
 
In terms of water supply, distribution, and waste water treatment and disposal, municipalities 
fully recover their costs of these services through user levies, and then some. Municipal user 
levies account for more than 100% of costs across Alberta, with cities recover nearly 150% of 
costs from user levies while all other types of municipalities recover 70%. There are two key 
concerns here. First, whether the accrued surplus from user levies relative to costs is compliant 
with the legal constraints on user levies, but the data is not sufficient to determine if the 
underlying legal authority for these levies is a user fee, regulatory charge, or proprietary charge. 
In that latter case, surpluses would be permitted, whereas in the form cases, they would not. 
Second, smaller jurisdictions have a lower recovery of costs from user fees. Whether this is due 
to a greater reliance on property taxes or grants due to small population bases is a question for 
consideration. 
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It is interesting to compare this Alberta data with that from a recent study by the Ecofiscal 
Commission. The Ecofiscal Commission (2017) recently conducted a detailed analysis of the 
application of user levies to municipally provided water and wastewater systems in Canada. 
They found that over the past two decades municipalities have shifted towards user charges for 
these systems. In particular, they found that 80% of larger cities currently derive their water 
utility revenues from user levies, but a much small proportion of revenues come from user levies 
in small municipalities. Instead, small municipalities rely more on funding from federal and 
provincial grants. While they noted that the trend though varies across Canada, almost every 
municipality in Western Canada already charges user levies for water services. In contrast, 
municipalities in Quebec still rely heavily on property taxes to fund water and wastewater 
system, which may explain why water leaks are the highest in Quebec than in any other province 
(Environment Canada 2011, p. 8). It is interesting to note, however, that while Canadians overall 
are still the highest consumers of water, Alberta has the second lowest total water use per capita 
in Canada (Environment Canada 2011, p. 5). It may be that this is the direct result of the user 
levies on the service lines.  
The last service line to be considered is related to waste management. Municipalities in Alberta 
recovery 86% of their waste management costs from user levies. As with the other service lines, 
the share is much higher in cities (94%) than in other types of municipalities (64%). While these 
levies appear to align with a model of cost recovery, it is not clear that the fees align with 
encouraging waste reduction and waste diversion from landfills. For the most part, the waste 
management user levies in Alberta are fixed monthly fees that do not vary according to waste 
generation. This is important since Canadians are among the biggest generators of waste in the 
world, diverting a relatively small share of their waste away from landfills.  
4.2 Emerging Opportunities 
As noted in the chapter by Slack and Bird (2018) in this volume, it may be that the best time to 
convince users that they should pay for the services they consume is when the initial investment 
needs to be made or when something has changed to elevate the importance of increased 
investment in or highlight the pressure on existing infrastructure. In this case it is worthwhile to 
explore emerging areas in which user levies could be introduced or expanded.  
4.2.1 Storm Water Levies 
According to Environment and Climate Change Canada (2016), many areas in Canada have been 
experiencing increased precipitation year-round. This increase in precipitation has led to an 
increase in over land flooding incidents (Government of Canada 2016) and mounting pressure 
for municipalities to increase their efforts in managing storm water to reduce such flooding 
incidents. Further, as the severity, intensity, and regulatory implications of precipitation events in 
most of Canada are expected to continue to increase due to climate change this increases the 
need for funding for storm water infrastructure and their associated operating costs. In addition, 
the amount of impervious surfaces in municipalities, like roads, buildings, rooftops, patios, and 
paved surfaces mean that the precipitation that is falling cannot be as easily absorbed, meaning 
the water has few places to go other than the storm water system. Finally, many provinces and 
the federal government have legislated that municipalities address the environmental impacts of 
storm water pollution in public waterways. Storm water eventually ends up ponds, rivers, lakes, 
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oceans, and the like and as the water travels over properties on its way to the storm water system 
it picks up various environmental contaminants, include pesticides, motor oil, and chemicals. 
In many jurisdictions in Canada, most of the costs associated with building, operating, and 
maintaining the storm water system are funded through property taxes, particularly in non-urban 
areas. The limitation of relying on property taxes is that funding for storm water infrastructure 
must compete with other priorities, and it provides no incentive to the property owner to take 
action to reduce the flow of water from the property into the storm water system by reducing the 
amount of impervious surfaces on their property.  
Some jurisdictions have begun to apply a storm sewer charge on water or sewer bills, but this 
typically means the fee is either fixed or related to water usage, either of which are poor 
measures of usage of the storm water system. Further, imposing a levy on a water or sewer bill 
exempts properties that do not use these municipal services (i.e., they are on well water or septic) 
yet directly benefit from the storm water system, does not incentivize property owners to reduce 
the amount of impervious surface area on their property, and in some municipalities means that 
the City itself must also pay the levy, creating the need for it to find a way to fund this payment.   
A levy that was popularized in the U.S. and has recently seen implementation in Canada is a 
storm water user fee based, at least in part, on a property’s impervious area. There are two cost 
components to fund storm water: the fixed costs related to the infrastructure itself and the 
variable costs that come from the pressure storm water run-off places on the infrastructure. The 
fixed portion of the fee, which is related to the infrastructure costs, could differ across broad 
categories of users. For example, the infrastructure costs for properties in rural areas may differ 
from those costs for properties in urban areas and the fixed portion could vary according to these 
differences. The variable cost based on impervious surface is more administratively complex, 
which is likely why the take up in Canada has been low so far. The ideal would be to assess 
every property for factors that contribute to storm water run-off (e.g. slope, vegetation, buildings, 
paved surfaces), but doing so would be complicated. It is something that could be considered to 
be included in provincial property assessments over time as a way to encourage municipalities to 
move towards the user pay model, something recommended by the Environmental 
Commissioner of Ontario (ECO 2016). In lieu, the variable portion could be based on an 
equivalent residential unit which is “calculated through a statistical sampling of measured 
impervious areas for residential dwelling to determine the average equivalent residential unit 
(ERU) or single-family unit (SFU) (square meters of impervious area) that are used as the base 
billing unit against which the fee is calculated.” (ECO 2016, p. 20) The municipality can then 
also provide incentives to reduce impervious surfaces by providing discounts for property 
owners that enact changes that reduce the amount of impervious surface by a substantial degree.  
The storm water user fee could be paired with a development regulatory charge that is applied to 
new developments or redevelopments to cover the costs of providing services and infrastructure 
to the development. Including the costs of storm water infrastructure could help cover the costs 
of the initial infrastructure requirements, with the user fee then applying to the homes to cover 
the costs of repair, maintenance, replacement, and operations. The charge could be reduced for 
developers that develop projects that have less impervious surfaces.  
4.2.2 Electric Vehicle Charging Levies 
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Electric Vehicles (EVs) are becoming more common place on Canadian roads: electric vehicle 
sales increased 56% in 2017 over 2016, and there are an estimated 42,000 total EVs in Canada 
(Stevens 2017). EVs are most popular in Quebec and B.C. but are seeing a rise in popularity in 
Ontario (Stevens 2017). Governments in Canada seem eager to support the purchase of EVs. The 
federal government, through Budget 2016, provided $62.5M over two years to support 
alternative transportation fuels and infrastructure, including charging infrastructures for EVs, and 
accelerated to the capital cost allowance provided under the tax system so that expenses related 
to EV charging stations can be deducted more quickly. Many provincial governments are 
providing various tax incentives towards the purchase of EVs as well as working with the federal 
government to roll out charging infrastructure. 
The increasing demand for EV charging stations, however, also presents a challenge and 
opportunity for municipalities. Municipalities, particularly in B.C., are eager to support measures 
to reduce community greenhouse gas emissions, yet providing EV infrastructure to help promote 
an EV shift in pursuit of this is costly. Indeed, the ability to charge an EV remains one of the 
biggest barriers to EV take-up by consumers (City of Port Coquitlam 2017, p. 6). While, as noted 
above, there is an effort by governments to fund the establishment of EV charging stations, 
municipalities may not find the locations suitable to their needs and still need to consider the 
operating costs of this infrastructure as well as related costs. Given that there are both individual 
benefits and social benefits to EV use if they reduce air pollution and greenhouse gas emissions, 
this suggests there is some role for the public subsidization of EVs through the revenues from 
broadly applied taxes, but also a role for user levies. Further, the free provision of municipal EV 
charging can result in unwanted behavior, including EV drivers preferring municipal charging 
stations over charging at home or at the workplace because of the cost differential, and EV 
drivers monopolizing municipal EV stations, reducing access and turnover of the stations.  
There are three inter-related aspects to providing EV charging stations: a parking space, a 
charging station infrastructure and its maintenance11, and the cost of the electricity consumed for 
charging12. Municipalities, of course, through its by-laws can ensure that EV infrastructure is 
part of any new buildings and developments and can provide incentives for the private sector to 
provide the infrastructure. There are also opportunities for municipalities to obtain revenues from 
this demand. First, private suppliers, like Tesla, are interested in installing their charging stations 
in municipalities. Rather than these be solely at private facilities, the municipality can negotiate 
the installation of these privately-provided charging stations on municipal property in 
exchanging for a rental/leasing charge for the use of the property. In this case a leasing charge 
would be a proprietary charge. A related problem with this model, however, is what to do about 
the parking spot that will be redeployed and used by the EV chargers. Does it also become part 
of the proprietary charge related to the EV charging station or does the municipality charge 
separately for the parking? Not charging for the parking leads to incentivizing EV drivers to 
remain parked at and hooked up to the EV charging station, despite their vehicle no longer 
needing a charge. Additionally, the private provision model may not align with the objectives of 
 
1111
 The costs associated with the preparation of a site and the installation of the EV charging station itself should not 
be understated. The costs of preparation rise according to the distance from a power source, the available electrical 
supply, and the type of charging station. (Government of Connecticut 2014, 9. 9) 
12
 In many jurisdiction, including B.C., the re-sale of electricity for profit is prohibited. Electricity can, however, be 
resold at cost.  
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the municipality, notably ensuring the fee charged by the private provider still encourages EV 
take-up.  
Alternatively, the municipality could buy or lease the infrastructure themselves and provide the 
service directly and recoup their costs in several ways. One model would be a user fee where the 
fee would reflect the cost of the one-time service. Another model would be to develop a 
regulatory scheme with an associated regulatory charge related to charging, either in lieu of the 
user fee model above or in tandem. In this case, the municipality would issue permits to 
applicants that would permit them to use the municipally provided EV charging infrastructure. In 
either case, the fee or charge should reflect all costs to some degree as reflected in the policy of 
the municipality: parking, infrastructure, maintenance, and electricity. This means that the fee 
would most likely be a combination of a fixed and variable fee. The fee or charge would have to 
be set to meet the competing objectives of cost recovery, ensuring turnover of spaces, 
encouraging home charging, incentivizing take-up of EVs, and fairness across users and 
nonusers. These competing objectives may mean there would still be some need for a 
municipality to cover a portion of the associated costs through revenues from taxes. Doing so, 
however, should be carefully considered and assessed given that EV use is highly positively 
correlated with income and wealth.13 
4.2.3 Linear Property Levies 
Most people are familiar with the residential and commercial property along with their features, 
but many are unfamiliar with linear property. Linear property is typically property that crosses 
municipal boundaries and includes pipelines, wells, electric power systems, telecommunications 
systems, cable distribution, and the like (Government of Alberta 2017). Linear property poses 
challenges to municipalities along several lines. One challenge pertains to the direct burden 
linear property places on municipalities in terms of costs that may not be fully addressed through 
a linear property tax revenue system, if one exists. Another challenge is that many linear 
property pose potential environmental consequences, particularly pipeline and well development. 
In addition, there is the risk of environmental contamination that could result in ongoing costs to 
the municipality. Adding to this risk is that when the linear property is not directly on municipal 
property, the municipality may not know precisely the location of the property hindering risk 
assessment and response. This brings along the fact that municipalities faced with linear property 
in their region face costs related to ensuring appropriate emergency response systems, teams, 
training, equipment, and clean-up, all of which is often highly specialized to each form of linear 
property (Pearce et al 2015, p. 4). Finally, the municipality may also face economic risk, 
including costs associated with development constraints, loss of space, loss of agricultural land, 
and loss of tourism (Pearce et al 2015, p. 7) which is not addressed through other means. While 
some may want to discount these concerns, tackling them may go a long way to increasing 
support for the expansion of linear property in Canada, notably pipelines.  
When a linear property runs along private property, the owner of linear property typically pays 
the property owner rent for the use of the land. The same can be true for linear property that runs 
along (or under) municipal sidewalks, roads, and other property. This property is a public right of 
way and municipalities have the right to manage the public right of way according to their local 
 
13
 The most recent data from the Center for Sustainable Energy shows that more than 75% of EVs sold are sold to 
people earning $100,000 or more a year (Center for Sustainable Energy (2018).  
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standard. This includes the ability to charge for the use of the public rights of way by owners of 
linear property. There are two ways to do this. One way is through a local rights-of-way access 
fee, which is commonly classified as a regulatory charge. This route has the municipality 
establish a regulatory charge that is ancillary to a detailed regulatory regime that is detailed in a 
by-law. Through this regulatory scheme, municipalities could recoup their costs, including those 
related to permitting, coordination, inspections, administration, repair, and damage costs. It may 
also be able to recoup any costs related to emergency response and levy fines provided that the 
regulatory scheme is written accordingly. The regulatory regime and fee can also require the 
owner of the linear property to obtain a permit before it accesses the linear property for any 
reason.  
Another approach, often employed in a complementary way to a right-of-way access regime, is 
through franchise or access agreements (FCM 2009). An important part of a franchise agreement 
is a proprietary charge that permits access to municipal property. Rather than a one-sized fits all 
approach to regulating access to municipal property that occurs through a rights-of-way regime, 
this approach has the municipality negotiate individual agreements with each linear property 
owner wanting access to the municipal rights-of-way. A franchise of access agreement sets use 
the charges and the conditions for use of public land. The owner of the linear property then is 
free to pass these costs onto the consumer. The franchise agreement could establish, as part of 
the charges, a fair market rate for the access to the public right-of-way which would allow for 
revenue generation opportunities, as permitted under a proprietary charge.  
It should, however, be noted that a proprietary charge related to a public right of way has been 
rejected by the CRTC related to telecommunications linear property. This was embedded in a 
2001 Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission (CRTC) decision 
(Ledcor), which greatly limited the costs municipalities could recoup through the rights-of-way 
regulatory charge regime, notably related to casual costs and rejecting proprietary charges 
(CRTC 2001; Federation of Canadian Municipalities 2008, 2009) and some telecommunications 
providers ignore the need to seek approval and pay for access.  
4.3  Considerations 
It has already been established that municipal governments are employing user levies to a greater 
degree than both the federal and provincial governments, but municipalities are provided with 
very little guidance from provinces with respect to the varied application of user levies. While 
large municipalities have the ability to rely on sophisticated internal and external advice, the 
same is not true of smaller jurisdictions that lack internal capacity. That data clearly shows that 
some municipalities are demonstrating a greater success at employing user levies than others. 
Some of this can be ameliorated by a broad municipal user levy design and implementation 
guide, similar to that provided by Althaus and Tedds (2016) for user fees. The knowledge gap 
can also be bridged by examining case studies related to emerging opportunities for the expanded 
reliance of user levies. A number of the current pressures being faced by municipalities appear to 
be ripe for funding through user levies, but whether any particular municipality has the authority 
to levy these charges on these services would be dependent on a review of that municipalities 
enabling legislation and careful attention to the crafting of the by-law, regulatory regime, or 
related supporting document. 
5.0 Conclusion 
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This chapter documents the increasing use of user levies by municipalities in Canada. User levies 
account for between 26-58% of municipal own-source revenue, varying by province. While there 
is no easy way to break this down by type of user levy with the data that is available, the trends 
suggest that the provinces vary in their knowledge, understanding, and benefits of user levies and 
their broad applicability, though Alberta seems to have heard the message. The chapter details 
the three different types of user levies available to municipalities and details the legal limitations 
of them. While these legal limitations limit the tools as revenue sources, they still provide 
valuable ways for municipalities to manage their proprietary interests and recoup costs, 
alleviating pressures on the property tax revenues. To aid municipalities take up of various user 
levies, the chapter also considers the deployment of user levies by Alberta municipalities in four 
key areas and the emerging application of user levies in three emerging areas, namely; storm 
water levies, EV charging levies, and levies on linear property. This shows that municipalities 
have room to expand their use of the various user levies in novel ways.  
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